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Abstract
The inherent openness of wireless medium makes information security one of the most
important and difficult problems in wireless networks. Physical layer security, which
achieves the information-theoretic security by exploiting the differences between the
physical properties of signal channels such that a degraded signal at an eavesdropper
is always ensured and thus the original data can be hardly recovered regardless of how
the signal is processed at the eavesdropper, has been studied as a promising approach
to providing a strong form of security.
By now, many research works have been devoted to understand the fundamental
performance limits of physical layer security under different wire-tap channel models.
It is notable that among different wire-tap channel models, the fading channel model
has been an important model to efficiently capture the basic time-varying properties
of wireless channels. Available works related to physical layer security study of the
fading wire-tap channel are mainly based on the assumption that the channel from a
transmitter to a legitimate receiver is independent of the one from the transmitter to
an eavesdropper. In practice, however, the correlation among channels from a trans-
mitter to different receivers has been frequently observed. Therefore, understanding
the performance of physical layer security under the more practical correlated fading
channels is of great importance for practical applications of physical layer security in
wireless networks.
In this thesis, we aim to provide a comprehensive study on the fundamental per-
formance limits of physical layer security under a fading wire-tap channel, where
the channel from transmitter to legitimate receiver is correlated with the one from
transmitter to eavesdropper. We start the study from the scenario when the transmis-
sion power is asymptotically infinite. In particular, we first provide an information-
theoretic formulation of secure transmission over wireless fading channels at one re-
alization of coherence interval in the high transmission power regime and show that
the secrecy capacity is limited by the channel gain ratio of the main and eavesdropper
channels rather than the transmission power, which is different from the Shannon’s
capacity that increases with transmission power. We next characterize the asymp-
totic outage probability and also asymptotic outage secrecy capacity for the correlated
fading wire-tap channel as the transmission power goes to infinity.
We then analyze the performance of physical layer security under correlated fad-
ing wire-tap channel with a limited transmission power, a more complicate scenario
compared with the one with asymptotic-infinite power. Specifically, we provide theo-
retical modeling for the secrecy capacity, transmission outage probability and secrecy
outage probability of such systems. In particular, we first derive a simple closed-
form expression of secrecy capacity based on the typical Marcum Q function. This is
achieved by exploring the symmetry property between the main channel and eaves-
dropper channel such that some complicated integration operations involved in the
secrecy capacity analysis can be significantly simplified. We then derive the trans-
mission outage probability and secrecy outage probability to depict the reliability
and security performances of the concerned wire-tap channel. Finally, extensive nu-
merical results are provided to illustrate the inherent performance tradeoffs under
i
fading wire-tap channel and also the potential impact of channel correlation on such
tradeoffs.
Our results reveal that the channel correlation between the main and eavesdropper
channels has a significant impact on both secrecy capacity and outage performances.
Remarkably, the impacts of correlation on the outage performances can be helpful
or harmful depending on the channel conditions of both the main and eavesdropper
channels and also the secrecy rate adopted in the transmission.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we will introduce the background of the physical layer security, in-
cluding the importance of physical layer security and a briefly review about its history
and a state-of-art survey. We then describe our motivations this thesis. Finally, the
contributions together with the outline of this thesis will be presented.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Physical Layer Security
The inherent openness of wireless medium allows anybody within the coverage range
of a transmitter to capture its signals, which makes information security one of the
most important and difficult problems in wireless networks. Traditionally, the infor-
mation security is usually addressed above the physical layer in the seven-layer OSI
model of computer networking, such as the widely adopted cryptography, which is
usually employed at the application layer assuming the physical layer has already
provided an error-free link [50]. The traditional cryptography is usually achieved by
encrypting the plain message by means of special algorithms that are assumed to be
computationally infeasible for the adversary to decrypt if the encryption keys are un-
known at the adversary. However, because of improvements in computers’ computing
abilities and methods of breaking encryption algorithms, there are concerns that such
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security methods no longer suffice, especially for applications with a requirement of
strong form of security (like military networks). For example, the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) encryption scheme, which employs a 56-bit key, was approved as
standard by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards in 1976; however, a DES cryp-
togram was broken for the first time in public in 1997, and furthermore, a DES key
was broken by the Deep Crack hardware in just 56 hours in 1998 [44].
Recently, the physical layer security has been studied as a promising approach
to providing a strong form of security for wireless networks. Unlike the cryptogra-
phy that ignores the difference between the received signals at different receivers, the
physical layer security is achieved by exploring the differences between the physical
properties of signal channels to achieve the unconditionally secure, i.e., the security
achieved with no limitation about the adversary’s computing power. As such, the
physical layer security is usually regarded as information-theoretic security, which is
now widely accepted as a stronger notion than computational security. The explosive
growth of wireless applications coupled with the desire for information privacy indi-
cate a bright future for physical layer security, both as stand-alone security solutions
and as part of the layered security schemes. However, the study of such promising
physical layer security is still on its initial stage and the fundamental theoretical
performances and practical coding techniques remain largely unknown.
To illustrate the general concept of physical layer security, Fig. 1-1 shows the
typical example of a three-node network where the transmission from node N1 to N2 is
being eavesdropped by a third-party malicious node N3. The communication channel
from N1 to N2 is called the main channel, whereas the channel from N1 to N3 is called
the eavesdropper channel. Since the two receivers N2 and N3 are located in different
places, the signals received by them are usually different. The inherent reason is that
the two channels through which signals pass have different fading effects. Basically,
there are two different types of fading: small scale fading and large scale shadowing.
Small scale fading, which is also called multipath fading, varies with surrounding
scatters that reflect wavefront between transmitter and receiver differently, and it
may cause deep fades even within small distances. Large scale shadowing, on the
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N1 N2
N3
Main channel
Eavesdropper channel
Figure 1-1: Illustration of eavesdropping scenario
other hand, is very dependent on location with respect to obstacles. It is worth noting
that these effects are varying all the time according to the surrounding environments.
And the physical layer security can be achieved by exploring these effects: The system
transmits secret messages when the main channel has better channel condition than
the eavesdropper channel, and suspends transmissions otherwise. Note that there
also exists the maximum allowed information rate for each system, which is termed
as secrecy capacity. Just like Shannon’s capacity, secrecy capacity defines the tightest
upper bound on the amount of information that can be reliably transmitted without
any information leakage.
1.1.2 Related Work
Literally, the physical layer security is also regarded as information-theoretic security,
since its security is derived purely from information theory.
Initial works of physical layer security
The theoretical basis of physical layer security starts from Shannon’s notion of perfect
secrecy: If the eavesdropper’s uncertainty (entropy rate) about the plain message
after seeing the transmitted signal is equal to the one before seeing the transmitted
signal, then ”perfect secrecy” is said to be achieved [68]. Based on this notion,
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Wyner initiated the study of physical layer security from a basic wire-tap channel,
where a source node transmits a message to a destination node through a discrete
memoryless channel and another malicious node called wire-tapper eavesdrops this
message through another degraded version of the discrete memoryless channel [85].
Wyner showed that a positive information rate can be achieved with perfect secrecy
if the eavesdropper channel is noisier than the main channel and that there exists
channel codes which ensure the message is reliably delivered to the legitimate receiver,
while the uncertainty at eavesdropper is not reduced by her observation, as long as
the rate of the code is selected to be smaller than the secrecy capacity. We refer to
this channel code as a ”wiretap code”.
Later, Wyner’s work was generalized to some other important scenarios. In 1978,
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner studied the non-degraded channels and showed that is is possible
to achieve a non-zero secrecy capacity if the main channel is less noisy or more capable
than the wiretapper channel [7]. In the same year, Wyner’s results for discrete mem-
oryless channel was extended to the Gaussian channel, where the secrecy capacity is
shown to be the difference between the capacities of the main and wire-tap channels
[32]. It is notable that the results in the above early works showed that a positive
secrecy capacity can be achieved if the intended receiver has a better channel than
the eavesdropper.
State-of-the-art
Recently, various research works are being conducted to understand the physical layer
security from both theoretical and practical aspects. The practical efforts mainly fo-
cus on designing practical wiretap codes that approach the secrecy capacity as much
as possible. Inspired by the early works of [85] and [57], Wei studied the method to
encode secrecy information using cosets of certain linear block codes for wire tap II
channel [84]. More recently, Thangaraj et al. [76] proposed an LDPC based construc-
tion for specific discrete memory-less channels, and Klinc et al. [25] proposed another
LDPC based construction for Gaussian channels. In recent work [47] and [18], polar
codes have been suggested as methods for approaching the secrecy capacity of general
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degraded and symmetric wiretap channels, of which the erasure wiretap channel is a
special case. Since the main focus of this thesis is on the theoretical performance of
the physical layer security, which serves as design criterions for practical security sys-
tems and coding schemes, we will give a more detailed introduction of its theoretical
status.
Many works have been done on the study of theoretical performance of the physi-
cal layer security. These works can be roughly classified into two categories depending
on the network scales, namely point-to-point networks and large-scale networks. It
is noticed that a major performance metric for point-to-point networks is secrecy
capacity, and we now give a short review based on channel models adopted. Firstly,
the initial results for Gaussian channels [32] were generalized to fading channels in
[3, 14, 37, 38], and it was shown that fading alone guarantees the information-theoretic
security is achievable, even when the main channel has a worse average signal-to-noise
ratio than the eavesdropper channel. Secondly, many researchers considered multiple-
input multiple-output wiretap channel [22, 24, 41, 43, 45, 54], where each node have
multiple antennas to improve their received signals. Next, some works considered
multi-user wiretap channels, such as multiple access channel [36, 74], broadcast chan-
nel [20, 31, 77, 86], relay channel with confidential messages [1, 5, 28, 55, 56], in-
terference channel with confidential messages [17, 42, 72, 73], cognitive interference
channels [35, 40, 51, 63], etc.
For large-scale networks, many recent research efforts have been conducted to
characterize their security performances in terms of capacity [27, 39, 60, 78], cover-
age [64], connectivity [12, 15, 59, 88] and percolation phenomenon [60, 61, 65, 66].
Specifically, various statistical characterizations of the existence of secure connections
were given in [15, 59, 60, 88]. Using tools from percolation theory, the existence of a
secrecy graph was analyzed in [12, 15, 60]. These connectivity results are concerned
with the possibility of having secure communication, while they do not give insight
on the network throughput. The authors in [27, 39, 78] derived secrecy capacity
scaling laws in static and mobile ad hoc networks, i.e., the order-of-growth of the
secrecy capacity as the number of nodes increases. Inspired by some early works of
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transmission capacity study [2, 11, 16, 81–83], some recent works [89, 90] propose
the notion of secrecy transmission capacity, which is defined as the achievable rate of
successful transmission of confidential messages per unit area for given constraints on
the quality of service (QoS) and level of security. It is expected that the scaling laws
of secrecy capacity provide us insights into the general asymptotic network behavior,
while the exact results of secrecy transmission capacity provide a finer view of tradeoff
between different system parameters and transmission protocols.
Research efforts were also conducted for techniques to improve the received signals
at legitimate receivers or deteriorate the ones at eavesdroppers. With the additional
degrees of freedom provided by multi-antenna systems, transmitters can generate
artificial noise to degrade the channel condition of the eavesdropper while maintaining
little interference to legitimate users [13, 23, 71]. Interference alignment technique has
been explored in [26, 27, 46] to achieve positive secure degrees of freedom. Some recent
work [28, 75] studied the method of cooperative jamming, in which a relay transmits
a jamming signal at the same time when the source transmits the message signal,
to interfering the signal received at eavesdroppers. The beamforming transmission
has been studied to maximizes the received signal power at the legitimate receiver
[34, 67].
1.2 Motivations
By now, much research activity has been devoted to understand the fundamental
performance limits of physical layer security under different wire-tap channel models
(see Section 1.1.2 for related works). It is notable that among different wire-tap
channel models, the fading channel model has been an important model to efficiently
capture the basic time-varying properties of wireless channels [70]. Available works
related to physical layer security studies of fading channel model are mainly based on
the assumption that the channel from transmitter to legitimate receiver is independent
of the one from transmitter to eavesdropper. In practice, however, the channels
from a transmitter to different receivers are frequently correlated [29, 62, 69]. Such
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correlation depends on many factors in the communication environment, such as the
presence or absence of scatters around transmitter and receivers, clearance of signal
path, and physical deployment of receiver antennas, etc. Moreover, the correlation
can be also caused deliberately. For example, eavesdroppers can actively induce
correlation by approaching a legitimate receiver [19]. Therefore, understanding the
performance of physical layer security under practical correlated fading channels is
of great importance for practical applications of physical layer security in wireless
networks.
1.3 Contributions and Outline
1.3.1 Contributions
In this thesis, the overall aim is to provide a comprehensive study on the funda-
mental performance limits of physical layer security under a fading wire-tap channel,
where the channel from transmitter to legitimate receiver is correlated with the one
from transmitter to eavesdropper. The novelty of the thesis is that unlike most of
previous work focuses on the independent fading channels, our study focuses on the
correlated fading channel model, which is more realistic compared with the previ-
ous one. Another novelty is that the performance metrics we derived in this thesis
are closed-form expressions, especially the complex secrecy capacity was also derived
in closed-form expression based on the typical Marcum Q function. The methods
in our theoretical analysis mainly combined the information theory, statistics, and
integration techniques of special functions, such as Marcum Q function.
The main contributions of the thesis are summarized as follows:
• Theoretical models: For unlimited transmission power scenario, we derive asymp-
totic outage probability and asymptotic outage secrecy capacity in simple closed-
form expressions. For limited transmission power scenario, secrecy capacity is
derived to depict the maximum information rate that can be achieved both
reliably and securely; transmission outage probability and secrecy outage prob-
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ability are further derived to depict the reliability and security performances of
the concerned wire-tap channel, respectively.
• Impact of channel correlation: Our results reveal that the channel correlation
between the main and eavesdropper channels has a significant impact on both
secrecy capacity and outage performances. In particular, we reveal that the im-
pact of correlation on secrecy capacity is always harmful; however, the impact
of correlation on the outage performances can be either helpful or harmful de-
pending on the channel conditions of both the main and eavesdropper channels
and also the secrecy rate adopted in the transmission.
It is notable that our theoretical models, derived for correlated channels, also cover
the corresponding models for independent channels as special cases. It is expected
that theoretical models we developed could provide guideline for efficient security
systems design, and that the impacts of correlation on the security performances we
revealed would be helpful for network engineers to design practical secure systems.
1.3.2 Thesis Outline
The outline of the thesis is listed as follows:
• We introduce in Chapter 2 some key notions in physical layer security and
also our system model in this thesis. Specifically, the following topics will be
included: the fading wire-tap channel coupled with key information theoretic
notions, correlated channel model, channel state information and some system
assumptions.
• In Chapter 3, we focus on the performance analysis of the physical layer secu-
rity under correlated fading wire-tap channels when transmission power is large
(asymptotically infinite). We first provide an information-theoretic formula-
tion of secure transmission over wireless fading channels at one realization of
coherence interval in the high transmission power regime and show that the se-
crecy capacity is limited by the channel gain ratio of the main and eavesdropper
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channels rather than the transmission power, which is different from the Shan-
non’s capacity that increases with transmission power. We next characterize
the asymptotic outage probability and also asymptotic outage secrecy capacity
for the correlated fading wire-tap channel as the transmission power goes to
infinity, which cover the corresponding results when the main and eavesdrop-
per channels are independent as special cases. Based on the theoretical results,
the impact of channel correlation on the asymptotic outage probability and
asymptotic outage secrecy capacity are then explored.
• We further extend our analysis to a more practical scenario that transmis-
sion power is constrained in Chapter 4. Firstly, three metrics, namely secrecy
capacity, transmission outage probability and secrecy outage probability, are
introduced to fully depict the fundamental performance of applying physical
layer security to achieve secure and reliable information transmission over the
correlated fading wire-tap channel. Secondly, a simple closed-form expression
of secrecy capacity is derived based on the typical Marcum Q function. This
is achieved by exploring the symmetry property between the main channel and
eavesdropper channel such that some complicated integration operations in-
volved in the secrecy capacity analysis can be significantly simplified. Thirdly,
the transmission outage probability and secrecy outage probability are further
derived to depict the reliability and security performances of the concerned wire-
tap channel, respectively. Finally, with the help of these theoretical models, we
then explore the inherent performance tradeoffs under fading wire-tap channel
and also the potential impact of channel correlation on such tradeoffs.
9
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we reviews various key notions in information theoretic aspects of
physical layer security, which will serve as building blocks in the remainder of the
thesis, and introduces the system model of this thesis.
2.1 The Fading Wire-tap Channel
As initially introduced in Wyner’s paper, the wire-tap channel consists three nodes:
a transmitter, a receiver and an eavesdropper. The system model we consider is il-
lustrated in Fig. 2-1, where a transmitter (Alice) sends confidential messages to a
receiver (Bob) over a wireless fading channel, called main channel, while an eavesdrop-
per (Eve) eavesdrops the messages through another wireless fading channel, called
eavesdropper channel. Alice encodes a message, represented by random variable (RV)
W ∈ W = {1, . . . ,M}, into a codeword, represented by RV Xn ∈ X n, by using a
stochastic encoder fn(·) : W → X
n. The codeword Xn is then transmitted over the
main channel. The signal received by Bob is denoted by Y n ∈ Yn, while the signal
received by Eve is denoted by Zn ∈ Zn. After Bob receives the signal, he tries to
decode the received signal by using a decoder φ(·) : Yn → W . The message esti-
mated by Bob is denoted by Wˆ = φ(Y n). Here, W , X , Y and Z are the source,
the channel input alphabet, the channel output alphabet of the main channel and
the channel output alphabet of the eavesdropper channel, respectively. The realiza-
11
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Figure 2-1: The fading wire-tap channel
tions of the RVs W , X, Y and Z are represented by w, x, y and z, respectively.
Moreover, we have Xn = (X(1), X(2), . . . , X(n)), Y n = (Y (1), Y (2), . . . , Y (n)) and
Zn = (Z(1), Z(2), . . . , Z(n)).
The signal Y (i) received by Bob and Z(i) received by Eve can be determined as
Y (i) = Gm(i)X(i) +Wm(i),
Z(i) = Ge(i)X(i) +We(i), i = 1, 2, ..., n,
where n denotes the length of transmitted signal, Gm(i) and Ge(i) denote the channel
gains of the main and eavesdropper channels, respectively, and Wm(i) and We(i)
represent the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noise with
zero mean and variances Nm and Ne, respectively. It is assumed that both the
main and eavesdropper channels are quasi-static fading channels. In other words, the
channel gains, albeit random, are fixed during the transmission of an entire codeword
(Gm(i) = Gm and Ge(i) = Ge, ∀i = 1, . . . , n), and, moreover, independent from
codeword to codeword. This corresponds to situations where the coherence time of
the channel is large. It is further assumed that the codewords sent over the channels
are subject to the average power constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
E{|X(i)|2} ≤ P. (2.1)
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2.1.1 Information Theoretic Metrics
For a (M,n) code that is adopted in this thesis, the performance will be quantified
by the following measures.
Error Probability
The average error probability is defined as
Pe = Pr(Wˆ 6= W ). (2.2)
This probability is used to measure the level of reliable communication between Alice
and Bob.
Equivocation Rate
The measure for eavesdropper’s uncertainty aboutW , which is called the equivocation
rate, is defined as
Req =
1
n
H(W |Zn), (2.3)
where H(W |Zn) is the remaining entropy of W given that the value of Zn is known.
It indicates the secrecy level of confidential messages against the eavesdropper.
Secrecy Rate
The information rate for the secret message is determined by
R∗s = H(W )/n. (2.4)
For a uniform distributed message W ∈ W , we have M = 2R
∗
s .
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Perfect Secrecy
We say perfect secrecy is achieved for a (M,n) code if Req = R
∗
s. A perfect secrecy
rate Rs is said to be achievable if there exists a (2
nRs , n) code such that Req ≥ Rs− ǫ
and Pe ≤ ǫ for any given ǫ > 0.
Notice that the condition for perfect secrecy used here (and also in [85], [4], [19])
is weaker than the one proposed by Maurer and Wolf in [49], where the information
leaked to the eavesdropper is negligibly small not just in terms of rate but in absolute
terms. Maurer and Wolf showed that the notions could be used interchangeably for
discrete memoryless channels, but this result was then extended to the Gaussian case
in [52].
Secrecy Capacity
The secrecy capacity Cs is defined as the maximum achievable perfect secrecy rate
[4], i.e.,
Cs , sup
Pe≤ǫ
Rs. (2.5)
2.2 Correlated Channel Model
In this thesis, we consider the scenarios that the main channel is correlated with the
eavesdropper channel, and both are ergodic fading channels. It is assumed that Gm
and Ge are two complex Gaussian RVs with zero-mean. Thus, the joint distribution
of their envelops follows the bivariate Rayleigh distribution [8]. This corresponds to
situations of narrow-band systems under a rich scattering environment that produces
multiple propagation waves. By the central limit theorem, in-phase and quadrature
components of Gm and Ge in such a system can be considered as Gaussian processes.
Denoting Gm = Gmc + jGms and Ge(i) = Gec + jGes, we consider the following
simple scenarios for the correlation between the main and eavesdropper channels.
• The in-phase components Gmc and Gec are independent of the quadrature com-
ponents Gms and Ges.
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• The in-phase components Gmc and Gec are correlated and the quadrature com-
ponents Gms and Ges are also correlated. The correlation coefficient between
in-phase components is the same as that between the quadrature components,
and we denote this coefficient as ρGm,Ge , i.e.,
ρGm,Ge =
cov(Gmc, Gec)√
var(Gmc)var(Gec)
=
cov(Gms, Ges)√
var(Gms)var(Ges)
. (2.6)
In this thesis, our analysis is mainly based on the correlation coefficient ρ between
the power gains of the main and eavesdropper channels, which is determined by
ρ =
cov(Hm, He)√
var(Hm)var(He)
. (2.7)
Since the power gains are determined by Hm = |Gm|
2 and He = |Ge|
2, we have
ρ = |ρGm,Ge |
2.
In real radio communication scenarios, the correlation coefficient ρ is determined
by various physical conditions of transmission environment such as the distance be-
tween Bob and Eve, the presence or absence of scatters around them, clearance of
signal path, and physical deployment of receiver antennas, etc. For example, if Bob
and Eve have the omnidirectional antennas in dense multipath environments, Clarke’s
2-D isotropic channel model is suitable to measure the correlation effect [80]. More
recently, simple and intuitive geometrical interpretations of the fading statistics are
suggested in [9] where the spatical fading correlation is effectively described by sev-
eral spatial parameters, like the angular spread, angular constriction, and azimuthal
direction of maximum fading. The correlation coefficient can also be determined by
field measurements.
2.3 Channel State Information
In wireless communication, channel state information (CSI) refers to channel prop-
erties of a communication link, including channel gain, fading distribution, noise
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strength, and spatial correlation, which can be used to describe how a signal propa-
gates from a transmitter to a receiver. There are basically two levels of CSI, namely
instantaneous CSI and statistical CSI. The instantaneous CSI indicates the current
channel conditions, while the statistical CSI refers to statistical characterizations of
the channel, which can be in turn determined if the instantaneous CSI is known. The
instantaneous CSI makes it possible to adapt transmissions to the current channel
conditions, which is crucial for reliable communication, while the statistical CSI has
no such advantage.
For the quasi-static fading channel considered in this thesis, it is always possible
to achieve the CSI of main channel since Bob can cooperate with Alice by feeding
back the channel estimates to her, while it is hard to achieve the Eve’s if he keeps
silence. Nevertheless, there exist scenarios that Alice can achieve Eve’s CSI, or at least
statistical CSI. For example, Eve is another active user in the wireless network but
is not allowed to hear the secret messages, so Alice can estimate the Eve’s channel
during Eve’s past transmissions. In this thesis, our analysis mainly focus on the
scenario that before transmission Alice has only partial CSI known in the sense that
she knows the instantaneous CSI (i.e., real time channel gain) of the main channel
and also the statistical CSI of both channels, but has no idea about the instantaneous
CSI of the eavesdropper channel. However, it is noticed that the performance metrics
derived in this paper are also important in other CSI assumptions, which will be
clearly indicated in the next two chapters.
2.4 Other Assumptions
The scope of the wiretap channel is restricted to passive eavesdropping strategies
where the adversary does not tamper with the main channel or the eavesdropper’s
channel.
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Chapter 3
Physical Layer Security under
Asymptotic-Infinite Transmission
Power
This chapter address the problem of the overall reliable and secure performance of
physical layer security (PLS) under the more practical correlated fading wire-tap chan-
nel when the transmission power is approaching infinity. Both the asymptotic outage
probability and outage secrecy capacity are derived in simple closed-form expressions.
Unlike Shannon’s result for channel capacity that increases with transmission power,
the asymptotic secrecy capacity is found to be controlled by the channel power gain
ratio, rather than the transmission power. It is also noticed that channel correlation
has exactly the opposite impacts on the asymptotic outage secrecy capacity depends
on its asymptotic outage probability.
3.1 Motivation and Outline
The problem of secure communication over the fading wireless channels, where the
transmitter does not have the CSI of the eavesdropper channel, has attracted consid-
erable attention recently. For delay-tolerant applications, the performance limits of
such systems have been characterized by ergodic secrecy capacity [14, 21], which cap-
17
tures the capacity limits under the constraint of perfect secrecy. For delay-sensitive
applications, however, perfect secrecy cannot always be achieved, and outage-based
performance metrics (e.g., outage secrecy capacity) become more appropriate [3, 58].
If no instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper channel is available, the transmitter will
always transmit at a constant rate (possibly set up according to the statistics of the
channels), thus an outage happens whenever the channel cannot support transmis-
sion at the designated constant secrecy rate, i.e., whenever the instantaneous secrecy
capacity is less than the secrecy rate. In [3, 58], an outage probability formula was
proposed to give a fundamental characterization of the possibility of having a reliable
and secure transmission, where their studies focused on the fading channel that the
main channel is independent of the eavesdropper channel. In real radio communi-
cation scenarios, however, the correlations between channels from a transmitter to
different receivers have been frequently observed [29, 62, 69].
Motivated by the above observations, this chapter is aimed to provide an analysis
about the outage performances of the physical layer security under the more practical
correlated fading wire-tap channel based on the outage formula that presented in
early works [3, 58]. In particular, we will start the study from the extremely case
that transmission power is very large and derive simple closed-form expressions for
both the asymptotic outage probability and outage secrecy capacity. The study for
the power limited scenario, which involve a more complicated derivation process, will
be provided at the next chapter. Furthermore, we are interested on the asymptotic
behaviors of the outage secrecy capacity as the transmission power goes to infinity,
and also the impact of channel correlation on it.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduces in Section
3.2 the previous studies that have directly relation with this chapter’s contents. In
Section 3.3, we describes the additional system assumption besides the fading wire-
tap model proposed in Chapter 2, and provides the formal definition of performance
metrics that is going to be studied in this chapter. Then Section 3.4 derives the
theoretical models of the asymptotic outage probability and outage secrecy capacity
for the concerned correlated fading wire-tap channel. In Section 3.5, the implications
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of the above results are discussed, such as the impact of channel correlation on outage
secrecy capacity, and the tradeoff between the outage secrecy capacity and outage
probability. Finally, concluding remarks of this chapter are given in Section 3.6.
3.2 Related Research Works
For the independent fading wire-tap channel, Gopala et al. [14] characterized the
corresponding ergodic secrecy capacity under the optimum power allocation strat-
egy with full CSI or partial CSI. Almost at the same time, Bloch et al. [4] derives
the average secrecy capacity for the same independent fading channel with a power
constraint under the full CSI assumption. Notice that wireless channels are always
fluctuating and it is very difficult (if not impossible) to acquire the real time CSI of
channels. Thus the full CSI assumption is not really realistic with current technolo-
gies. For the more realistic scenarios where the transmitter only knows the CSI of
the main channel, a better performance measure is the outage secrecy capacity, which
is defined as the maximum information rate that can be maintained such that the
maximum secrecy outage probability is no more than the specified value. Moreover,
for delay sensitive applications, where we need to ensure a high data rate by allowing
a certain probability of outage, the outage secrecy capacity is of greater interest.
In some early works [3, 58], the outage probability for the physical layer security
method was defined as the probability that the secrecy capacity drops below a given
transmission rate of the secret message. Specifically, Parada et al. analyzed in [58]
the independent fading wire-tap channel with multiple receiver antennas and derived
an approximate outage probability; Barros et al. provided in [3] a closed-form outage
probability for the independent fading wire-tap channel, and a corresponding formula
for the outage secrecy capacity.
To the best of our knowledge, however, no work is available on the outage secrecy
capacity study under the more realistic correlated fading wire-tap channel. The re-
lated study under the correlated fading wire-tap channel is the work by Jeon et al.
in [19], where they explored the asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity of correlated
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fading channels when the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is infinite under the full CSI
assumption. Therefore, our analysis in this chapter provides the outage probability
and outage secrecy capacity of the correlated fading wire-tap channel for the scenario
that only partial CSI is available at transmitter.
3.3 System Assumptions and Performance Met-
rics
To characterize the asymptotic performances of the concerned system described in
Chapter 2 as transmission power approaches infinity, we further assume that the noise
powers at Bob and Eve are similar, i.e., Nm = Ne. Without loss of generality, we
assume Nm = Ne = 1 to simplify the analysis.
Since the full CSI is not available at Alice, we consider the transmission scheme
that Alice always transmit at a target secrecy rate Rs > 0. It is noticed that the
setting of Rs can be determined based on the statistical CSIs of both the main and
eavesdropper channel if they were available at Alice before transmission. To depict the
performance of the concerned wiretap fading channel, the following two performance
metrics are adopted. The instantaneous secrecy capacity denotes the secrecy capacity
determined by the a realization of the channel gains of both the main and eavesdropper
channels [4].
• Outage probability: The overall outage probability is defined as the probability
that the target secrecy rate is less than the instantaneous secrecy capacity.
• Outage secrecy capacity: The outage secrecy capacity is the maximum secrecy
rate that can be maintained under any fading condition during nonoutage co-
herence intervals such that the allowed outage probability is satisfied.
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3.4 Outage Performance Analysis
We begin with the secrecy capacity for one realization of the fading channels at a
coherence interval during which the channel gains are assumed to be constant. It is
assumed that the transmission power is P . As stated in [4], it is reasonable to view
the main channel in this scenario as a complex additive white gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel with its SNR PHm and capacity
Cm = log(1 + PHm). (3.1)
Similarly, the eavesdropper channel is a complex AWGN channel with its SNR
PHe and capacity
Ce = log(1 + PHe). (3.2)
It is known that the secrecy capacity of a complex AWGN wiretap channel is
just the difference between the main and eavesdropper channels there [4]. Thus, the
secrecy capacity for one realization of the fading coefficients is derived as
Cs =

 log(1 + PHm)− log(1 + PHe), if Hm > He;0, if Hm ≤ He. (3.3)
3.4.1 High SNR Regime
It is easy to deduce from (3.1) that the channel capacity without secrecy constraint
grows nearly logarithmically with the SNR. However, the secrecy capacity shows a
different behavior as the SNR increases.
From (3.3), when the main channel gain is better than the eavesdropper channel
gain (e.g. Hm > He), the asymptotic secrecy capacity for one pair of channel gains is
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given by
Cs = log(1 + PHm)− log(1 + PHe)
= log
( 1
P
+Hm
1
P
+He
)
(a)
≤ log
(
Hm
He
)
, C lims , (3.4)
where the equality in (a) holds as P goes to infinity (i.e., high SNR), and the asymp-
totic secrecy capacity is denoted as C lims . Thus, the asymptotic secrecy capacity is
controlled by the channel power gain ratio.
3.4.2 Asymptotic Outage Probability and Outage Secrecy
Capacity
According to the definition in 3.3, the outage probability can be given by
Pout(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs). (3.5)
The operational significance of this definition of outage probability is threefold. First,
it provides the fraction of fading realizations for which a wireless channel can support
a secrecy rate of Rs bits/channel use. Second, it provides a security metric for the
situation where Alice have no CSI of eavesdropper channel, which corresponds to
the scenario that Eve is a purely passive and malicious eavesdropper in the wireless
network. In this case, Alice has no choice but to set the secret transmission rate to
a constant Rs. By doing so, Alice is assuming that the capacity of the eavesdropper
channel is given by C
′
e = Cm − Rs. As long as Rs < Cs, the eavesdropper channel
is worse than Alice’s estimate, i.e., Ce < C
′
e, and the wiretap codes used by Alice
can ensure perfect secrecy. Otherwise, if Rs > Cs, then Ce > C
′
e and the physical
layer security is compromised. Third, for a delay-sensitive application, we can achieve
much higher communication rates by allowing some outage probability. If no outage
is allowed, we can hardly transmit any information in poor channel conditions.
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Adopting the same notations as that in [19], we let U = Hm/He. The average
Channel power Gain Ratio (CGR) is denoted as κ = E[Hm]/E[He], and the channel
Power Correlation Coefficient (PCC) between Hm and He is ρ. Under the Rayleigh
fading assumption, the probability density function (PDF) of the channel power gain
ratio U is derived as [19]
fU(u) = κ
(1− ρ)(u+ κ)
[(u+ κ)2 − 4ρκu]3/2
, u ≥ 0. (3.6)
Thus, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If the main channel is correlated with the eavesdropper channel, and the
joint PDF of them follows the bivariate Rayleigh distribution, as the SNR increases,
the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is larger than τ (τ ≥ 0) is upper
bounded by
P
(
C lims > τ
)
=
1
2
−
2τ − κ
2
√
(2τ + κ)2 − 4ρκ2τ
. (3.7)
Proof.
P
(
C lims > τ
)
= P
(
log
(
Hm
He
)
> τ
)
= P(log u > τ)
=
∫ ∞
2τ
fU(u)du
=
[
u− κ
2
√
(u+ κ)2 − 4ρκu
]∞
2τ
=
1
2
−
2τ − κ
2
√
(2τ + κ)2 − 4ρκ2τ
Remark 1. When the main and eavesdropper channels are not correlated, that is
ρ = 0, the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is larger than τ (τ ≥ 0)
is upper bounded by
P
(
C lims > τ
)
=
κ
2τ + κ
,
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which is just the upper bound of the similar probability in [4] when the main channel
SNR goes to infinity.
According to the definition in 3.3, the outage secrecy capacity for a outage con-
straint of ǫ can be given by
Cout(ǫ) , maxPout(Rs)≤ǫ
(Rs). (3.8)
The above outage secrecy capacity is also called ǫ-outage secrecy capacity in the
literally [3, 33].
Since the upper bound of the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity
is larger than a specified value is derived in Lemma 1, we can obtain the lower bound
of the outage probability for a target secrecy rate Rs and also the corresponding upper
bound of the outage secrecy capacity in a closed-form, as summarized in Theorem
1. Notice that the bounds of the outage probability and outage secrecy capacity are
denoted as P limout (Rs) and C
lim
out (ǫ), since they are derived based on the asymptotic
secrecy capacity as the transmitting power P goes to infinity (i.e., high SNR).
Theorem 1. If the main channel is correlated with the eavesdropper channel and
the joint PDF of them follows the bivariate Rayleigh distribution, as the transmission
power P increases, the outage probability for a target secrecy rate Rs is lower bounded
by
P limout (Rs) = P
(
C lims 6 Rs
)
=
1
2
+
2Rs − κ
2
√
(2Rs + κ)2 − 4ρκ2Rs
; (3.9)
and the outage secrecy capacity is upper bounded by
C limout (ǫ)=


[
log
(
−κ
(√
ϕ2−1 + ϕ
))]+
, if 0<ǫ≤ 1
2
;[
log
(
κ
(√
ϕ2−1− ϕ
))]+
, if 1
2
<ǫ<1.
(3.10)
where ϕ = (2ǫ−1)
2(1−2ρ)+1
(2ǫ−1)2−1 , [x]
+ = max{0, x} and ǫ is the specified outage probability.
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Proof.
P limout (Rs) = P
(
C lims 6 Rs
)
= 1− P
(
C lims > Rs
)
.
By substituting (3.7) into the above equation, the result (3.9) then follows.
We continue to prove the the Eq. (3.10). we will first show that C limout (ǫ) equals the
target secrecy rate Rst under the condition that P
lim
out (Rst) = ǫ, and then determine
the actual value of C limout (ǫ) based on the monotonicity of P
lim
out (Rst) with respect to
Rst.
Based on (3.9), the derivative of P limout (Rst) is given by
(
P limout (Rst)
)′
=
2Rstκ(1− ρ)
(
2Rst + κ
)
ln 2[
(2Rst + κ)2 − 4κρ2Rst
]3/2 . (3.11)
Since Rst > 0, κ > 0 and 0 ≤ ρ < 1, it is easy to see that 2
Rstκ(1−ρ)
(
2Rst + κ
)
ln 2 >
0. Moreover, we have
(
2Rst + κ
)2
− 4κρ2Rst > 0 due to that 22Rst + κ2 ≥ 2κ2Rst >
2κρ2Rst . Therefore, we have
(
P limout (Rst)
)′
> 0, which indicates P limout (Rst) monotoni-
cally increases with Rst. In other words, Rst monotonically increases with the outage
probability. Thus, according to the definition of ǫ-outage secrecy capacity in (3.8),
we find that C limout (ǫ) = Rst with condition that P
lim
out (Rst) = ǫ.
By letting P limout (Rst) = ǫ, we get
(
2Rst + κϕ
)2
= κ2
(
ϕ2 − 1
)
, (3.12)
where ϕ = (2ǫ−1)
2(1−2ρ)+1
(2ǫ−1)2−1 . The derivative of ϕ with respect to ǫ can be derived by
ϕ′ = −
8(2ǫ− 1)(1− ρ)
[(2ǫ− 1)2 − 1]2
. (3.13)
From (3.13), we find the fact that ϕ monotonically increases with ǫ in the region ǫ ∈
(0, 1/2] and strictly decreases with ǫ in the region ǫ ∈ (1/2, 1), and the maximum value
is achieved as ϕ = −1 at the point ǫ = 1/2. We then let f1(ϕ) = −κ
(√
ϕ2 − 1 + ϕ
)
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and f2(ϕ) = κ
(√
ϕ2 − 1− ϕ
)
. We find the fact that f1(ϕ) monotonically increases
with ϕ and f2(ϕ) monotonically decreases with ϕ in the region ϕ ∈ (−∞,−1). Com-
bining the above two facts and also the fact that C limout (ǫ) monotonically increases with
ǫ, the result (3.10) then follows.
Remark 2.
1) From (3.9), when Rs → 0 and ρ→ 0, it follows that ,
P limout →
1
1 + κ
,
which corresponds to the independent channel case in [3].
2) When the main and eavesdropper channels are completely correlated, i.e., ρ→
1, the outage probability for a target secrecy rate Rs becomes
lim
ρ→1
P limout (Rs) =

 0, if Rs < log κ;1, if Rs ≥ log κ. (3.14)
On one hand, (3.14) shows that outage must happen when the target secrecy rate
Rs is greater than the asymptotic secrecy capacity at the average channel power gain
ratio (i.e., Rs ≥ log κ). On the other hand, if the main and eavesdropper channels
are completely correlated, the information outage can be avoided by choosing a target
secrecy rate Rs less than the asymptotic secrecy capacity at the average channel power
gain ratio (i.e., Rs < log κ).
3) Regardless of the correlation coefficient, the outage probability goes to 0 if the
target secrecy rate is far below the asymptotic secrecy capacity at the average channel
power gain ratio (e.g., Rs ≪ log κ), and goes to 1 if the target secrecy rate is far
above the asymptotic secrecy capacity at the average channel power gain ratio (e.g.,
Rs ≫ log κ).
About the impact of correlation on the asymptotic outage secrecy capacity, we
have the following lemma.
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Lemma 2. When 0 < ǫ ≤ 1
2
, C limout (ǫ) increases as the correlation coefficient ρ grows;
when 1
2
< ǫ < 1, it decreases as ρ grows.
Proof. First, since ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ [0, 1), it is easy to derive that ϕ = (2ǫ−1)
2(1−2ρ)+1
(2ǫ−1)2−1
is monotonically increasing with respect to ρ and ϕ < 0. Second, let f1(ϕ) =
−κ
(√
ϕ2 − 1 + ϕ
)
and f2(ϕ) = κ
(√
ϕ2 − 1− ϕ
)
. Then, the derivatives of them
are given by
f
′
1 (ϕ) = −κ
(
1 +
ϕ√
ϕ2 − 1
)
(3.15)
and
f
′
2 (ϕ) = κ
(
−1 +
ϕ√
ϕ2 − 1
)
, (3.16)
respectively. Since κ > 0 and ϕ < 0, we can find that f
′
1 (ϕ) > 0, which indicates
that f1(ϕ) monotonically increases with ϕ < 0, and f
′
2 (ϕ) < 0, which indicates that
f2(ϕ) monotonically decreases with ϕ < 0. Finally, combined with the fact that the
logarithm does not change the monotonicity, the above lemma can be proved.
3.5 Numerical Results and Discussions
Based on the theoretical models derived in this chapter, this section provides some
numerical values to explore the potential impact of channel correlation on the outage
performances and also some inherent performance tradeoffs.
3.5.1 Impact of Correlation on Outage Probability
From (3.9), it is easy to find that when the target secrecy rate Rs is less than the
asymptotic secrecy capacity at CGR κ (i.e., Rs < log κ), the outage probability that
can be achieved is less than 1/2. When the target secrecy rate Rs is greater than
the asymptotic secrecy capacity at CGR κ (i.e., Rs > log κ), we can still transmit a
secret message but with outage probability greater than 1/2. It means that when the
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Figure 3-1: Asymptotic outage probability vs. channel power gain ratio (CGR) κ,
for some selected values of ρ and Rs = 0.1.
main channel is better than the eavesdropper channel (i.e., κ > 1), we can achieve a
positive outage secrecy capacity with outage probability less than 1/2 irrespective of
correlation level.
To examine the impact of CGR and PCC on the outage probability, Fig. 3-1
depicts the asymptotic outage probability versus CGR, for some selected values of
PCC and for the target secrecy rate Rs equal to 0.1 bits. It is noticed that the
asymptotic outage probability decreases as the CGR grows, which is reasonable since
the outage probability decreases as the main channel gets better. Moreover, if the
asymptotic secrecy capacity at CGR log κ is larger than the target secrecy rate Rs =
0.1 bits (i.e., κ > 0.3 dB), then the asymptotic outage probability is less than 1/2;
otherwise the outage probability becomes greater than 1/2. It is also important
to observe that the impact of correlation on the asymptotic outage probability has
different behaviors in the low and high CGR regimes. In the low CGR regime, the
outage probability increases as the correlation grows. However, in the high CGR
regime, the outage probability decreases as the correlation grows. Thus, the possible
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correlation should be considered to determine the target secrecy rate or the outage
probability in real applications. Notice that channel correlation becomes helpful only
when κ > 0 dB and Rs < log κ (i.e., Pout < 1/2). If the main channel’s average gain
is worse than the eavesdropper’s (i.e., κ < 0 dB), a positive secrecy rate can still be
achieved, though the corresponding outage probability will be over 1/2. The above
phenomenon is reasonable since if κ > 0 dB, then the larger the correlation level, the
higher the probability of having Hm > He.
3.5.2 Impact of Correlation on Outage Secrecy Capacity
Now, we investigate the impact of correlation on the outage secrecy capacity at the
low and high outage probabilities, respectively 4.
Figs. 3-2 and 3-3 depict the asymptotic outage secrecy capacity versus CGR, for
some selected values of PCC and for the case that the asymptotic outage probability
is less than 1/2 (0.1 here) and the case that the asymptotic outage probability
is larger than 1/2 (0.75 here), respectively. We can see that the asymptotic outage
secrecy capacity grows as the CGR increases for both outage probability requirements
there. For the same CGR and the same PCC, it is also noticed that the asymptotic
outage secrecy capacity grows as the outage probability increases. Furthermore, the
asymptotic outage secrecy capacity increases as the PCC grows when the outage
probability is less than 1/2, while it degrades as the PCC grows when the outage
probability is greater than 1/2, which indicates that the correlation is helpful when
ǫ < 1/2 but becomes harmful when ǫ > 1/2. Notice that the numerical results
agree with the theoretical analysis in Lemma 2 well. The physical reason of such
phenomenon is given as follows. Let Ust denote the target channel power gain ratio
(i.e., Ust = 2
Rs). From (3.9), it is obvious that Ust < κ when ǫ < 1/2 and Ust > κ
when ǫ > 1/2. As the PCC ρ grows, the power gain of the main channel Hm and that
of the eavesdropper channel He vary much more similarly for any coherence interval,
which indicates that the probability of having the real time channel power gain ratio
4Although the high outage probability is not pursued in real applications, it is desirable for us
to understand the impact of correlation under this scenario.
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Figure 3-2: Asymptotic outage secrecy capacity vs. channel power gain ratio (CGR)
κ, for some selected values of ρ and ǫ = 0.1.
U = Hm/He close to the average one κ = E[Hm]/E[He] increases (i.e., the variance of
U decreases in statistics). Thus, the value of the target channel power gain ratio Ust
for a specified ǫ increases as ρ grows when Ust < κ, and decreases as ρ grows when
Ust > κ. Therefore, the target secrecy rate Rs and thus the asymptotic outage secrecy
capacity increases as the PCC grows when ǫ < 1/2, but decreases when ǫ > 1/2.
3.5.3 Outage Probability vs. Outage Secrecy Capacity
In this subsection, we examine the relation between the asymptotic outage probability
and asymptotic outage secrecy capacity under the following three cases: 1) the main
channel’s condition is better than the eavesdropper’s; 2) the main channel’s condition
is the same as the eavesdropper’s; 3) the main channel’s condition is worse than the
eavesdropper’s.
Figs. 3-4, 3-5 and 3-6 show the asymptotic outage secrecy capacity versus outage
probability for some selected values of PCC and for the three scenarios that the
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Figure 3-3: The asymptotic outage secrecy capacity vs. channel power gain ratio
(CGR), for some selected values of ρ and ǫ = 0.75.
main channel’s condition is better than the eavesdropper’s (κ = 10 dB), the main
channel’s condition is the same as the eavesdropper’s (κ = 0 dB) and the main
channel’s condition is worse than the eavesdropper’s (κ = −10 dB). In Fig. 3-5, it
is noticed that the outage secrecy capacity is 0 when the outage probability is less
than 0.5. In Fig. 3-6, it is also noticed that the positive outage secrecy capacity
can be achieved even when the main channel’s condition is much worse than the
eavesdropper’s, even though the outage probability is greater than 0.9. This is due
to the reason that, although E[Hm] < E[He] (i.e., κ < 0 dB), it is possible to have
coherence intervals during which Hm is larger than He since both the main and
eavesdropper channels are fading and not perfectly correlated there. From the three
figures, we can find that for a given outage probability the asymptotic outage secrecy
capacity at κ = 10 dB is the largest in comparison with the other two cases, which
indicates that the main channel’s condition should be maintained as good as possible.
Moreover, one can observe from Fig. 3-4 that the correlation between the main and
eavesdropper channels is constructive when the outage probability is less than 1/2,
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Figure 3-4: Asymptotic outage secrecy capacity vs. outage probability, for some
selected values of ρ and κ = 10 dB.
and becomes destructive when the outage probability is greater than 1/2. It is also
observed that the outage secrecy capacity can be enlarged by allowing a larger outage
probability.
3.5.4 PCC vs. CGR
It is noticed from the above discussions that channel correlation becomes helpful when
the target transmission rate is less than the asymptotic secrecy capacity at the CGR.
So, it is desirable to make the PCC as high as possible while keeping the CGR high
in a practical design of wireless communication. However, in real wireless networks,
an active eavesdropper can not only increase the PCC but also decrease the CGR by
approaching the legitimate receiver on purpose. Two natural questions are: What is
the tradeoff between the CGR and PCC? Is it necessary to keep a guard zone, defined
as the region around the receiver in which the eavesdroppers are not allowed?
Figs. 3-7 and 3-8 show examples of the tradeoff between CGR and PCC for some
selected target secrecy rates and for the cases that outage probability is less than 1/2
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Figure 3-5: Asymptotic outage secrecy capacity vs. outage probability, for some
selected values of ρ and κ = 0 dB.
(0.1 here) and larger than 1/2 (0.75 here), respectively. It is observed that the CGR
decreases as the PCC grows for the case when the outage probability is less than 1/2,
while the CGR increases as the PCC grows for the case when the outage probability is
greater than 1/2, which confirms our previous result that channel correlation becomes
helpful if the target transmission rate is less than the asymptotic secrecy capacity
at the CGR. Moreover, a more exact tradeoff between CGR and PCC is needed
so that it can provide a baseline to determine if an eavesdropper’s approaching is
harmful or not. We draw lines κ = 12 dB and κ = 2 dB in the Figs. 3-7 and 3-8,
respectively, and find that to increase one bit in the target transmission rate, a more
than fifty percent improvement of correlation level is needed for a fixed CGR, or about
3 dB improvement of CGR is needed for a specified PCC. Thus, in practical network
design, if an eavesdropper is approaching the main receiver to eavesdrop messages,
the situation for the eavesdropper does not become better if the PCC is increased
more than fifty percent when the CGR is decreased less than about a 3 dB, which is
a very impressive result for current studies which always assume the eavesdropper’s
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Figure 3-6: Asymptotic outage secrecy capacity vs. outage probability, for some
selected values of ρ and κ = −10 dB.
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(PCC), for some selected values of target secrecy rates with the outage probability
ǫ = 0.75.
approach is destructive.
3.5.5 Ergodic Secrecy Capacity vs. Outage Secrecy Capacity
In this subsection, we show the differences between the results in this chapter and
the previous results in [19] which consider the asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity of
the correlated Rayleigh fading wiretap channel.
Figs. 3-9 and 3-10 compare the asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity (i.e., equation
(5) in [19]) with the asymptotic outage secrecy capacity (i.e., equation (3.10) in this
chapter) under the assumption that the channels are independent and correlated, re-
spectively. It is noticed that the asymptotic outage secrecy capacity is no larger than
the asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity when the allowed outage probability is small
(0.1 here). However, if the allowed outage probability can be larger (0.75 here), the
corresponding asymptotic outage secrecy capacity is much larger than the asymptotic
ergodic secrecy capacity. Moreover, it is also observed that the difference between the
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Figure 3-9: Asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity/asymptotic outage secrecy capacity
vs. channel power gain ratio (CGR) when the channels are independent.
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Figure 3-10: Asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity/asymptotic outage secrecy capacity
vs. channel power gain ratio (CGR) when the channels are highly correlated.
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asymptotic ergodic secrecy capacity and asymptotic outage secrecy capacity becomes
less as the correlation level grows irrespective of outage probability. It is important
to notice that the above ergodic secrecy capacity is achieved under the assumption
that the CSIs of both the main and eavesdropper channels are available. For situa-
tions when full CSI cannot be achieved before transmission or when the delay-limited
transmission is required, the transmitter has to transmit the information with some
probability of outage and the outage secrecy capacity becomes the main performance
measure to refer to.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we derived the closed-form expressions of the asymptotic outage
probability and asymptotic outage secrecy capacity under the correlated Rayleigh
fading wiretap channel, which cover the special cases when the main and eavesdropper
channels are independent. Unlike Shannon’s result for channel capacity that increases
with transmission power, the asymptotic secrecy capacity is found to be controlled
by the channel power gain ratio, rather than the transmission power. We analyzed
the impact of correlation on the asymptotic outage probability and asymptotic outage
secrecy capacity, and observed that the asymptotic outage probability decreases as the
channel correlation grows in the high CGR regime, and the asymptotic outage secrecy
capacity increases as the channel correlation grows when the outage probability is
less than 1/2. Then, we analyzed the tradeoff between the asymptotic outage secrecy
capacity and outage probability which showed that the asymptotic outage secrecy
capacity can be increased by sacrificing the outage probability. Furthermore, the
tradeoff between the PCC and CGR is discussed, from which we find that the situation
for the eavesdropper does not become better if the PCC is increased more than fifty
percent while the CGR is decreased less than about 3 dB. This represents the scenario
that the eavesdropper is approaching the main receiver on purpose. Remarkably,
our results reveal that the correlation between the main and eavesdropper channels
becomes helpful when the main channel’s average channel gain is better than the
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eavesdropper channel’s and the outage probability is less than 1/2, and becomes
harmful otherwise.
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Chapter 4
Physical Layer Security under
Limited Transmission Power
This chapter extends the study to a more practical case of limited transmission power,
and address the problem of reliable and secure transmission design for the correlated
fading wire-tap channel under the partial CSI assumption.
4.1 Motivation and Outline
It is noticed that the study of secure information transmission under the basic fading
wire-tap channel serves as a foundation for secure information transmission in gen-
eral wireless networks. The available studies of physical layer security (PLS) under
the fading wire-tap channel either focus on the study under the independent fading
channels or asymptotic results as the transmission power goes to infinity under the
correlated fading channels. The available studies of physical layer security (PLS)
under the fading wire-tap channel either focus on the study under the independent
fading channels or asymptotic results as the transmission power goes to infinity under
the correlated fading channels. Therefore, the performance of physical layer security
under the general correlated fading wire-tap channel with a practical power constraint
is still unexplored. Motivated by the above observations, this chapter aims to pro-
vide a comprehensive study on the fundamental performance limits of physical layer
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security under a fading wire-tap channel, where the main channel is correlated with
the eavesdropper channel and the transmitter knows only the instantaneous CSI of
main channel.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduces in Section
4.2 the previous studies that have directly relation with this chapter’s contents. In
Section 4.3, we first describes the physical layer security method for the concerned
wire-tap channel model in detail, and then proposes three metrics to fully depict
the fundamental performance of applying physical layer security to achieve secure
and reliable information transmission over the correlated fading wire-tap channel.
Then Section 4.4 derives a closed-form secrecy capacity for the concerned correlated
fading wire-tap channel based on the typical Marcum Q function. In Section 4.5, the
transmission outage probability and secrecy outage probability are derived to depict
the levels of reliability and security, respectively. Based on the above theoretical
models, numerical results are provided in Section 4.6. Finally, we conclude in Section
4.7 the main results of this chapter.
4.2 Related Research Works
Adopting the physical layer security method to ensure the secure and reliable infor-
mation transmission over the fading wire-tap channels has been extensively studied,
for both the independent channels scenario and correlated channels scenario.
For the independent channels scenario, Bloch et al. [4] derived closed-form ex-
pressions of both the secrecy capacity and outage probability for the Rayleigh fading
wire-tap channel. For the fading wire-tap channel with full CSI or partial CSI, Gopala
et al. [14] characterized the corresponding ergodic secrecy capacity under the opti-
mum power allocation strategy. Zhou et al. [87] considered the Rayleigh fading
wire-tap channel and studied the secure and reliable information transmission there
when the real time CSI of the eavesdropper channel is not known at the transmitter.
They defined the secrecy outage probability as the probability of having only insecure
transmissions, which is different from the conventional outage probability defined as
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the probability of having either unreliable or insecure transmissions. Remarkably,
the above works reached a promising conclusion that using fading property alone
can achieve information-theoretic security, even when the main channel has a worse
average channel gain than that of the eavesdropper channel.
For the correlated fading wire-tap channel. Jeon et al. [19] investigated the secrecy
capacity of an ergodic fading wire-tap channel under the full CSI assumption, where
a closed-form expression of the asymptotic secrecy capacity was derived under the
infinite transmission power assumption. The results in [19] indicate that an excessive
large transmission power does not necessarily result in an improvement in the secrecy
capacity but the channel correlation always results in a degradation in the secrecy
capacity.
4.3 System Assumptions and Performance Met-
rics
Recall the outage probability defined in Chapter 3 is given by
Pout(Rs) = P(Cs < Rs). (4.1)
In this definition, an outage happens whenever the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs
is less than a target secrecy rate Rs, which includs the instants when a message trans-
mission is unreliable (i.e., Cm < Rs, which means that the main receiver Bob cannot
decode the message) and when it is not perfectly secured (i.e., Cs < Rs, which indi-
cates that there is some information leakage to Eve). Although this outage formula
gives a fundamental characterization of the possibility of having a reliable and secure
transmission, it does not distinguish between reliability and security. Therefore, in
this chapter, we will introduce two new outage metrics to characterize the level of
reliability and security respectively for the concerned wiretap channel model.
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4.3.1 Transmission Scheme
We now give a more detailed introduction about the transmission scheme adopted
for the physical layer security method. First, about transmission power control, we
consider a simple scheme where the transmission power is always fixed as P under
any fading state. With such a power control, the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) γm at Bob and SNR γe at Eve are then determined as
γm =
Phm
Nm
, (4.2)
γe =
Phe
Ne
. (4.3)
Second, for the coding of secret messages over codewords, the general idea of
coding scheme is adopted as follows. Let Rt denote the rate of transmission codewords
and Rs denote the rate of secret messages (thus M = 2
nRs). The encoder first
generates 2nRt different binary sequences of length nRt bits, and then independently
assigns each of them to one of the secret messages {1, . . . ,M}, following a uniform
distribution. To encode a particular message w, the encoder randomly selects a binary
sequence from the set of sequences assigned to w, and then encodes this sequence into
a codeword with length n. The settings of Rt and Rs are subject to the following
constraints: if the main channel’s capacity Cm is no less than Rt, then Bob will
receive the codeword reliably and thus recover the secret message; if the eavesdropper
channel’s capacity Ce is no larger than
1 Rt−Rs, the eavesdropper can be kept ignorant
about the secret message w [14, 32].
Finally, the following transmission scheme is adopted for transmission rate con-
trol. With the main channel’s real time CSI and thus SNR γm, Alice will transmit
whenever γm exceeds some SNR threshold µ ≥ 0, where the transmission codewords
rate Rt she adopts will be set to Cm, i.e., the capacity of the main channel and thus
the maximum information rate that can be reliably received by Bob. The secrecy
rate, which measures the rate of confidential messages hidden in the transmission of
1
Rt −Rs reflects the rate cost of securing the message transmission against eavesdropping.
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codewords, will be fixed to Rs for any transmission interval. This is because the ab-
sence of real time CSI of eavesdropper channel at Alice sheds doubt on the operational
significance of adopting a varying secrecy rate.
Remark 3. It is notable that the instantaneous CSI of the main channel and the
transmission threshold µ are required for the setting of Rt, while the statistical CSIs
of both the main and eavesdropper channels are needed for the setting of Rs to optimize
the system’s performance and meet the security requirement.
4.3.2 Performance Metrics
In the concerned system, we say a transmission is reliable if Rt ≤ Cm, otherwise
the unreliable transmission happens; we say a transmission is secure if Rt − Rs ≥
Ce, otherwise the insecure transmission happens. The secrecy rate Rs is said to be
achievable iff the transmission with Rs is both reliable and secure.
To fully depict the performance of the concerned wire-tap fading channel, the
following three metrics will be adopted.
• Secrecy Capacity: The maximum achievable secrecy rate averaged over all states
of the time-varying channel.
• Transmission Outage Probability: We call transmission outage happens if either
a unreliable transmission or transmission suspension happens. The transmis-
sion outage probability is then defined as the probability that the transmission
outage happens.
• Secrecy Outage Probability: We call secrecy outage happens if an insecure
transmission is conducted. The secrecy outage probability is thus defined as
the probability that the secrecy outage happens.
4.4 Secrecy Capacity
Secrecy capacity, which defines the tightest upper bound on the amount of information
that can be reliably and securely transmitted over a communication channel, can help
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us to understand the performance limits of the wire-tap channel systems and thus
serve as an instruction guideline for the performance optimization and engineering of
such systems.
About the evaluation of secrecy capacity for the wire-tap fading channel, we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For the concerned fading wire-tap channel system with SNR γm for the
main channel and SNR γe for the eavesdropper channel, the corresponding secrecy
capacity Cs is determined as
Cs =
∫ ∞
0
∫ γm
0
(
log
1 + γm
1 + γe
)
× f(γm, γe)dγedγm. (4.4)
where f(γm, γe) denotes the joint probability density function (PDF) of γm and γe.
Proof. During a coherence interval with SNR γm for the main channel and SNR γe for
the eavesdropper channel, the main channel’s capacity is Cm = log(1+ γm) while the
eavesdropper channel’s is Ce = log(1+γe). In the concerned system, where Rt changes
adaptively to Cm for each transmission interval, Rs is achievable if 0 < Rs ≤ Cm−Ce.
Thus, the best case is that whenever Cm > Ce, the transmission is conducted with
secrecy rate Cm −Ce such that the maximum secrecy rate in that coherence interval
can be achieved, while transmission is suspended whenever Cm ≤ Ce. The secrecy
capacity can then be achieved if the best case happens for each coherence interval.
Therefore, by averaging the maximum achievable secrecy rate over all fading states
(γm,γe), the secrecy capacity of the wire-tap channel system is determined as
Cs =
∫∫
[log(1 + γm)− log(1 + γe)]
+ f(γm, γe)dγedγm, (4.5)
where [x]+ = max{0, x}. By substituting the integration intervals of γm and γe into
(4.5), the result (4.4) follows.
The Lemma 3 indicates that to evaluate the secrecy capacity, we need to first
determine the PDF f(γm, γe).
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Lemma 4. For the concerned fading wire-tap channel system, where the correlation
coefficient between the power gains hm and he is ρ (0 ≤ ρ < 1), the joint PDF of γm
and γe is determined as
f(γm, γe) =
1
γ¯mγ¯e(1− ρ)
exp
[
−
1
1− ρ
(
γm
γ¯m
+
γe
γ¯e
)]
× I0
(
2
1− ρ
√
ργmγe
γ¯mγ¯e
)
, (4.6)
where γ¯m = E[γm], γ¯e = E[γe], and I0(x) ,
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
ex cos θdθ is the zero-order modified
Bessel function of the first kind.
Proof. For the concerned system, where the joint distribution of the two channels’
gain envelops follows the bivariate Rayleigh distribution, we know from [19] that the
joint PDF of hm and he is given by
f(hm, he) =
1
h¯mh¯e(1− ρ)
exp
[
−
1
1− ρ
(
hm
h¯m
+
he
h¯e
)]
× I0
(
2
1− ρ
√
ρhmhe
h¯mh¯e
)
, (4.7)
where h¯m = E[hm] and h¯e = E[he]. From (4.2), (4.3) and (4.7), the joint PDF of γm
and γe can be obtained as follows based on the Jacobian transformation [30],
f(γm, γe) = f(
Nmγm
P
,
Neγe
P
)|J(γm, γe)|
(a)
= f(
Nmγm
P
,
Neγe
P
)
NmNe
P 2
=
1
γ¯mγ¯e(1− ρ)
exp
[
−
1
1− ρ
(
γm
γ¯m
+
γe
γ¯e
)]
× I0
(
2
1− ρ
√
ργmγe
γ¯mγ¯e
)
,
where (a) follows that
|J(γm, γe)| = det

 NmP 0
0 Ne
P

 .
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Based on Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we now establish the following theorem on the
evaluation of secrecy capacity.
Theorem 2. For the concerned fading wire-tap channel system with parameters γm,
γe, γ¯m, γ¯e and ρ defined above, its secrecy capacity is determined as follows:
1) when 0 ≤ ρ < 1,
Cs = e
1
γ¯mE1
(
1
γ¯m
)
− e
1
γ¯eE1
(
1
γ¯e
)
+
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γe
e−
γe
γ¯eQ
(√
2
1− ρ
γe
γ¯m
,
√
2ρ
1− ρ
γe
γ¯e
)
dγe
−
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γe
e−
γe
γ¯mQ
(√
2ρ
1− ρ
γe
γ¯m
,
√
2
1− ρ
γe
γ¯e
)
dγe,
(4.8)
where E1(x) is the exponential-integral function defined as
E1(x) =
∫ ∞
1
exp (−tx)
t
dt,
and Q(x, y) is the first order Marcum Q function defined as [6]
Q(x, y) =
∫ ∞
y
t exp
(
−
t2 + x2
2
)
I0(xt)dt, x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0. (4.9)
2) when ρ = 1,
Cs =

 e
1
γ¯mE1
(
1
γ¯m
)
− e
1
γ¯eE1
(
1
γ¯e
)
, for k > 1;
0, for 0 < k ≤ 1,
(4.10)
here k = γ¯m/γ¯e.
Proof. 1) To evaluate the secrecy capacity in (4.4), we first derive the following an-
tiderivative. Let F (γe) denote the antiderivative of f(γm, γe) with respect to γe. Since
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f(γm, γe) is continuous in the domain {(γm, γe) : γm ≥ 0, γe ≥ 0}, we have
F (γe) =
∫ γe
0
f(γm, γe)dγe
(a)
=
1
γ¯m
exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)∫ √ 2γe
(1−ρ)γ¯e
0
te−
t2+x2
2 I0(xt)dt
=
1
γ¯m
exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)∫ ∞
0
te−
t2+x2
2 I0(xt)dt
−
1
γ¯m
exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)∫ ∞
√
2γe
(1−ρ)γ¯e
te−
t2+x2
2 I0(xt)dt
(b)
=
1
γ¯m
exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)[
1−Q
(
x,
√
2
1− ρ
γe
γ¯e
)]
,
where (a) follows by substituting x =
√
2ρ
1−ρ
γm
γ¯m
and t =
√
2
1−ρ
γe
γ¯e
, and (b) follows from
the fact that Q(x, 0) = 1.
By using the linearity rules of integration, the integral in (4.4) can be decomposed
into the following two parts:
t1 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ γm
0
log(1 + γm)× f(γm, γe)dγedγm
=
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + γm)
(∫ γm
0
f(γm, γe)dγe
)
dγm
=
1
γ¯m
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + γm) exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)
×
[
1−Q
(√
2ρ
1− ρ
γm
γ¯m
,
√
2
1− ρ
γm
γ¯e
)]
dγm
and
t2 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ γm
0
log(1 + γe)× f(γm, γe)dγedγm
(c)
=
1
γ¯m
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + γm) exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)
×
[
1−Q
(√
2ρ
1− ρ
γm
γ¯m
,
√
2
1− ρ
γm
γ¯e
)]
dγm
−
∫ ∞
0
∫ γm
0
1
1 + γe
× F (γe)dγedγm,
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where (c) follows the integration by parts. Notice that although the expressions of
t1 and t2 are complex, the complexity of the derivation can be reduced since t1 is a
part of t2. Therefore, the secrecy capacity can be derived as
Cs = t1− t2
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ γm
0
1
1 + γe
× F (γe)dγedγm. (4.11)
We continue to evaluate (4.11) by decomposing it into the following two parts:
t3 =
1
γ¯m
∫ ∞
0
∫ γm
0
1
1 + γe
exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)
dγedγm
=
1
γ¯m
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)
log (1 + γm) dγm
=
[
−e−
γm
γ¯m log (1 + γm)
]∞
0
+
∫ ∞
0
e−
γm
γ¯m
1
1 + γm
dγm
= e
1
γ¯mE1
(
1
γ¯m
)
,
and
t4 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ γm
0
e−
γm
γ¯m
γ¯m (1+γe)
Q
(√
2ρ
1−ρ
γm
γ¯m
,
√
2
1−ρ
γe
γ¯e
)
dγedγm
=
∫ ∞
0
dγe
1 + γe
∫ ∞
γe
e−
γm
γ¯m
γ¯m
Q
(√
2ρ
1− ρ
γm
γ¯m
,
√
2
1− ρ
γe
γ¯e
)
dγm
(d)
=
∫ ∞
0
dγe
1+γe
∫ ∞
√
γe
2xe−
x2
γ¯m
γ¯m
Q
(√
2ρx2
(1−ρ)γ¯m
,
√
2γe
(1−ρ)γ¯e
)
dx
(e)
= e
1
γ¯eE1
(
1
γ¯e
)
−
∫ ∞
0
1
1+γe
e−
γe
γ¯eQ
(√
2
1− ρ
γe
γ¯m
,
√
2ρ
1− ρ
γe
γ¯e
)
dγe
+
∫ ∞
0
1
1+γe
e−
γe
γ¯mQ
(√
2ρ
1− ρ
γe
γ¯m
,
√
2
1− ρ
γe
γ¯e
)
dγe,
where (d) is based on integration by variable substitution, and (e) follows from the
equation (36) in [53]. Thus, (4.8) can be derived determined as Cs = t3− t4.
2) Under the condition of ρ = 1, the power gains hm and he are linearly dependent,
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so the channel SNRs γm and γe are linearly dependent. Let k = γ¯m/γ¯e, we have γe =
γm/k. Since the main channel follows the Rayleigh distribution, γm is exponentially
distributed with its distribution function given by [4]
f(γm) =
1
γ¯m
exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)
. (4.12)
When γm ≤ γe (i.e. 0 < k ≤ 1), it is easy to see that the secrecy capacity equals to
0. When γm > γe (i.e. k > 1), the secrecy capacity is given by
Cs =
∫ ∞
0
log
(
1 + γm
1 + γm
k
)
f(γm)dγe
=
∫ ∞
0
log
(
k(1 + γm)
1 + γm
k
)
1
γ¯m
exp
(
−
γm
γ¯m
)
dγm
=
[
−
(
log
k(1+γm)
k+γm
)
e−
γm
γ¯m
]∞
0
+
∫ ∞
0
(k − 1)e−
γm
γ¯m
(1+γm)(k+γm)
dγm
= e
1
γ¯mE1
(
1
γ¯m
)
− e
1
γ¯eE1
(
1
γ¯e
)
. (4.13)
Remark 4. By setting the correlation coefficient ρ in (4.8) as 0, we have
Cs = e
1
γ¯mE1
(
1
γ¯m
)
−
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γe
e−
γe
γ¯mQ
(
0,
√
2γe
γ¯e
)
dγe
− e
1
γ¯eE1
(
1
γ¯e
)
+
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + γe
e−
γe
γ¯eQ
(√
2γe
γ¯m
, 0
)
dγe
(b)
= e
1
γ¯mE1
(
1
γ¯m
)
− e(
1
γ¯m
+ 1
γ¯e
)E1
(
1
γ¯m
+
1
γ¯e
)
, (4.14)
where (b) is due to the fact that Q(x, 0) = 1 and Q(0, y) = exp
(
−y
2
2
)
. It is notable
that (4.14) is just the average secrecy capacity [4] for independent fading wire-tap
channel under the full CSI assumption (i.e., CSI of both the main and eavesdropper
channels are available at the transmitter).
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4.5 Outage Performances
Transmission outage probability and secrecy outage probability are two important
metrics used for efficient design of reliable and secure transmission systems. Actually,
available works indicate that by allowing some probability of outage, the communi-
cation rates [33] can be increased greatly. For the concerned fading wire-tap channel,
this section first evaluates the basic transmission outage probability and secrecy out-
age probability, and then applies them to derive a related metric, namely the overall
outage probability that has been widely adopted in previous studies.
Based on the definitions in subsection 4.3, we can see that the transmission outage
probability pt and secrecy outage probability ps can be formulated as
pt , P(Rt > Cm|message transmission)
+ P(message suspended), (4.15)
ps , P(Ce > Rt −Rs|message transmission). (4.16)
It is notable that the secrecy outage probability is defined in the same way as in [87].
Regarding the evaluation of pt, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For any given transmission SNR threshold µ ≥ 0, the transmission
outage probability pt of the concerned fading wiretap channel is given by
pt = 1− exp(−
µ
γ¯m
). (4.17)
Proof. Based on the transmission scheme adopted in this chapter, the transmission,
whenever conducted, is always reliable since Rt is never larger than the capacity
Cm, so transmission outage happens only when transmission is suspended. Thus,
the transmission outage probability is just the probability that the transmission is
suspended, i.e.,
pt = P(γm ≤ µ) = 1− P(γm > µ). (4.18)
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Based on (4.6), we have
P(γm > µ)
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
µ
f(γm, γe)dγmdγe
(a)
=
∫ ∞
0
1
γ¯e
e−
γe
γ¯e
∫ ∞
√
2
1−ρ
µ
γ¯m
te−
t2+x2
2 I0(xt)dtdγe
(b)
=
∫ ∞
0
1
γ¯e
e−
γe
γ¯eQ
(√
2ρ
1− ρ
γe
γ¯e
,
√
2
1− ρ
µ
γ¯m
)
dγe
(c)
= 2
∫ ∞
0
ye−y
2
Q
(√
2ρ
1− ρ
y,
√
2
1− ρ
µ
γ¯m
)
dy
(d)
= e−
µ
γ¯m , (4.19)
where (a) follows by substituting x =
√
2ρ
1−ρ
γe
γ¯e
and t =
√
2
1−ρ
γm
γ¯m
, (b) is due to the
definition of the first order Marcum Q function as in (4.9), (c) follows by substituting
y =
√
γe
γ¯e
, and (d) is based on the following formula [53],
∫ ∞
c1
te−
b21t
2
2 Q(b2t, b3)dt
=
1
b21
e−
b21c
2
1
2 Q(b2c1, b3)
+
1
b21
e
− b
2
1b
2
3
2(b21+b
2
2)
[
1−Q
(
c1
√
b21 + b
2
2,
b2b3√
b21 + b
2
2
)]
.
The parameter b1 here is a real number, while b2 and b3 are real and positive numbers.
By substituting (4.19) into (4.18), the result in (4.17) follows.
Remark 5. Notice that (4.19) turns out to be the transmission probability under
independent fading wiretap channel [87], which only depends on γ¯m and threshold µ
but is independent of correlation coefficient ρ.
About the evaluation of secrecy outage probability ps, we have the following the-
orem.
Theorem 4. In the concerned fading wire-tap channel system with parameters γm, γe,
γ¯m, γ¯e and ρ defined above, its secrecy outage probability ps for any given transmission
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SNR threshold µ ≥ 0 and secrecy rate Rs > 0 is determined as follows:
1) when 0 ≤ ρ < 1,
ps = e
(1−ρ)µ
α
∞∑
l=0
(1− ρ)ρl
(l!)2
Γ
(
l + 1,
µ
α
)
Γ
(
l + 1,
τ
β
)
− e
1
α
(τ2Rs−ρµ)
∞∑
l=0
(1− ρ)ρl
l!β
(
1
β
)l l∑
j=0
1
j!
(
1
α
)j
×
j∑
i=0
(
j
i
)
2iRs(2Rs − 1)j−i
(
1−ρ
η
)l+i+1
Γ
(
l+i+1,
ητ
1−ρ
)
, (4.20)
where α = (1 − ρ)γ¯m, β = (1 − ρ)γ¯e, η =
1
γ¯e
+ 2
Rs
γ¯m
, τ = 1+µ−2
Rs
2Rs
, and Γ(l, x) is the
incomplete gamma function.
2) when ρ = 1,
ps =


1, for 0 < k ≤ 1;
1, for k > 1, Rs ≥ log2 k;
1− exp
[
− 1
γ¯m
(
µ+
k(2Rs−1)
k−2Rs
)]
,
for k > 1, log2 ψ<Rs< log2 k;
0, for k > 1, Rs ≤ log2 ψ;
where ψ = k(1+µ)
k+µ
and k = γ¯m/γ¯e.
Proof. 1) According to the secrecy outage formula (4.16), we have
ps = P(Ce > Cm −Rs|γm > µ) (4.21)
= P(γm < 2
Rs(1 + γe)− 1|γm > µ)
=
P(µ < γm < 2
Rs(1 + γe)− 1)
P(γm > µ)
= e
µ
γ¯m
∫ ∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
∫ 2Rs (1+γe)−1
µ
f(γm, γe)dγmdγe
(a)
= e
µ
γ¯m
∞∑
l=0
ρl
(l!)2
∫ ∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
1
γ¯e
e−
γe
(1−ρ)γ¯e
[
γe
(1− ρ)γ¯e
]l
dγe
×
∫ 2Rs (1+γe)−1
µ
e−
γm
(1−ρ)γ¯m
(1− ρ)γ¯m
[
γm
(1− ρ)γ¯m
]l
dγm
(b)
= e
µ
γ¯m
∞∑
l=0
ρl
(l!)2
∫ ∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
1
γ¯e
e−
γe
(1−ρ)γ¯e
[
γe
(1− ρ)γ¯e
]l
dγe
×
[
Γ
(
l + 1,
µ
(1− ρ)γ¯m
)
−Γ
(
l + 1,
2Rs(1+γe)−1
(1− ρ)γ¯m
)]
(c)
= e
µ
γ¯m
∞∑
l=0
(1−ρ)ρl
(l!)2
Γ
(
l+1,
µ
(1−ρ)γ¯m
)
Γ
(
l+1,
µ+1−2Rs
(1−ρ)γ¯e2Rs
)
− e
µ
γ¯m
− 2Rs−1
(1−ρ)γ¯m
∞∑
l=0
(
ρ
1−ρ
)l
1
l!
(
1
γ¯e
)l+1 l∑
j=0
1
j!
[
1
(1−ρ)γ¯m
]j
×
j∑
i=0
(
j
i
)(
2Rs−1
)j−i
2iRs
∫ ∞
µ+1
2Rs
−1
γe
l+ie
− 1
1−ρ
(
1
γ¯e
+ 2
Rs
γ¯m
)
γedγe,
where (a) follows that I0(x) =
∑∞
l=0
x2l
4l(l!)2
, (b) is due to the definition of the incomplete
gamma function
Γ(l, x) =
∫ ∞
x
tl−1e−tdt,
and (c) follows that Γ(l + 1, x) = l!e−x
∑l
j=0
xj
j!
for l = 0, 1, 2, . . .. By conducting some
simplifications to the above formula, the equation (4.20) follows.
2) When ρ = 1, γe is completely determined by γm (i.e., γe = γm/k). Thus, we
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have
ps = P(Ce > Cm −Rs|γm > µ)
= P
((
2Rs − k
)
γm > k
(
1− 2Rs
)
|γm > µ
)
, (4.22)
a) When 0 < k ≤ 1 (i.e., γm ≤ γe ), we have 2
Rs ≥ 1 ≥ k and thus
ps = P
(
γm >
k
(
1− 2Rs
)
(2Rs − k)
| γm > µ
)
= 1. (4.23)
It indicates that the secrecy outage happens as long as the transmission is conducted.
b) When k > 1 (i.e., γm > γe) and Rs > log2 k (i.e., 2
Rs − k > 0), we have
1− 2Rs < 0 and thus
ps = P
(
γm >
k
(
1− 2Rs
)
2Rs − k
|γm > µ
)
= 1; (4.24)
when k > 1 and Rs = log2 k (i.e., 2
Rs − k = 0), we have
Cm − Ce = log
k(1 + γm)
k + γm
< log k = Rs, (4.25)
which indicates that ps = 1.
c) When k > 1 and log2
k(1+µ)
k+µ
< Rs < log2 k, we have 2
Rs − k < 0 and
k(1−2Rs)
2Rs−k >
µ, so (4.22) can be derived as
ps =
P
(
µ < γm <
k(1−2Rs)
2Rs−k
)
P(γm > µ)
= e
µ
γ¯m
∫ k(2Rs−1)
k2Rs
µ
f(γm)dγm
= 1− exp
[
−
1
γ¯m
(
µ+
k
(
2Rs − 1
)
k − 2Rs
)]
. (4.26)
d) When k > 1 and Rs ≤ log2
k(1+µ)
k+µ
, we have 2Rs − k < 0 and
k(1−2Rs)
2Rs−k ≤ µ, so
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(4.22) can be derived as
ps =
P
(
µ < γm <
k(1−2Rs)
2Rs−k
)
P(γm > µ)
= 0.
Remark 6. When setting the correlated coefficient ρ in (4.20) as 0, the corresponding
secrecy outage probability reduces to
ps = e
µ
γ¯m Γ
(
1,
µ
γ¯m
)
Γ
(
1,
1 + µ− 2Rs
γ¯e2Rs
)
− e
1+µ−2Rs
γ¯m
γ¯m
γ¯m+γ¯e2Rs
Γ
(
1,
(
1
γ¯e
+
2Rs
γ¯m
)(
1 + µ
2Rs
−1
))
(a)
=
γ¯e2
Rs
γ¯m+γ¯e2Rs
exp
(
−
1 + µ− 2Rs
γ¯e2Rs
)
, (4.27)
where (a) is due to the fact that Γ(1, x) = e−x. Notice that (4.27) just corresponds to
the secrecy outage probability derived in [87] for independent fading wiretap channel
scenario.
It is notable that the outage probability, which is defined as Pout = P (Cs < Rs)
in [4, 58], is used to characterize the overall outage events due to either unreliable or
insecure transmission. To distinguish from the outage performance metrics derived
in this chapter, we call Pout as the overall outage probability here. Based on pt and
ps, the overall outage probability Pout can be also determined.
Corollary 1. For a given secrecy rate Rs, the overall outage probability Pout of the
concerned fading wiretap channel is given by
Pout = pt + ps(1− pt), (4.28)
where pt and ps are determined by (4.17) and (4.20), respectively, and µ in them is
fixed as 2Rs − 1.
Remark 7. When setting the correlated coefficient ρ in (4.28) as 0, the corresponding
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oveall outage probability reduces to
Pout = 1−
γ¯m
γ¯m + γ¯e2Rs
exp(−
2Rs − 1
γ¯m
). (4.29)
Notice that (4.29) is just the overall outage probability [4] for the independent fading
wire-tap channel.
4.6 Numerical Results and Discussions
Based on the theoretical models derived in this chapter, this section first illustrates
how the SNRs of the main and eavesdropper channels and the channel correlation be-
tween them affect the final achievable secrecy capacity, and then explores the inherent
tradeoffs between the achievable secrecy rates and outage probabilities and also the
impacts of channel correlation on such tradeoffs. Finally, comparisons between the
secrecy outage probability and conventional overall outage probability is provided to
illustrate their different effects on the final achievable secrecy rate.
4.6.1 Secrecy Capacity Discussion
To illustrate the impacts of SNRs of the main and eavesdropper channels on the
final achievable secrecy capacity, we show in Fig. 4-1 how the secrecy capacity Cs
varies with γ¯m and γ¯e under a moderate correlation scenario of ρ = 0.3. As shown in
Fig.4-1, Cs monotonically decreases with γ¯e for a specified γ¯m, while it monotonically
increases with γ¯m for a specified γ¯e. A further careful observation of Fig. 4-1 indicates
that besides γ¯m, the relative condition of the main channel against the eavesdropper
channel (i.e. k = γ¯m/γ¯e) also plays a critical role in determining the final secrecy
capacity. For example, when γ¯m = 10 dB, the secrecy capacity under the condition
of k = 10 will be 2.08, which is more than three times higher than the 0.65 secrecy
capacity under the condition of k = 1. It is also noticed that for a specified k, a
bigger γ¯m leads to a larger secrecy capacity. It is interesting to see from Fig. 4-1 that
even under condition that γ¯m ≤ γ¯e, a non-zero secrecy capacity can still be achieved.
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We now explore the impacts of channel correlation on the secrecy capacity. In Fig.
4-2, we illustrate how Cs varies with the correlation coefficient ρ for three different
scenarios of γ¯m and γ¯e: a better scenario with γ¯m = 5 dB and γ¯e = 0 dB, a normal
scenario with γ¯m = 5 dB and γ¯e = 5 dB, and a worse scenario with γ¯m = 0 dB and
γ¯e = 5 dB. For all the three scenarios, as shown in Fig. 4-2, the secrecy capacity
monotonically decreases with ρ, which indicates that the channel correlation has
a negative impact on the secrecy capacity. This is due to the reason that as the
channels becomes more correlated, they tend to behave more similar and thus the
chances for the transmitter to transmit at a high secrecy rate tend to decrease. A
careful observation of Fig. 4-2 indicates that as ρ approaches 1, Cs goes to 0 for both
the normal and worse scenarios, but converges to a fixed value that is determined
by (4.10) for the better scenario. Therefore, the potential channel correlation should
be carefully considered when designing a secrecy rate, otherwise information leakage
may happen due to the overestimated secrecy capacity.
4.6.2 Outage Performances Discusssion
To explore the inherent tradeoffs between the achievable secrecy rate and outage
probabilities, we show in Fig. 4-3 how the secrecy rate Rs varies with the transmission
outage probability pt and secrecy outage probability ps for the typical channel setting
of (γ¯m = 5 dB,γ¯e = 0 dB) [87] and a moderate correlation scenario of ρ = 0.3. We
can see from Fig. 4-3 that, in general, Rs monotonically increases as pt increases for
a given value of ps, and also monotonically increases as ps increases for a given value
of pt. It is notable that for a given transmission outage probability, the secrecy rate
can be greatly increased by allowing a small value of secrecy outage probability. Fig.
4-3 also shows that for the channel scenario there, we cannot transmit any secrecy
message with positive rate under relative strong outage requirements, e.g., pt = 0.1
and ps = 0.1 there.
To further explore the impacts of the channel correlation on the secrecy rate for
different outage requirements, we show in Fig. 4-4 how Rs varies with the correlation
coefficient ρ for the scenarios of γ¯m = 5 dB,γ¯e = 0 dB, pt = 0.3 and ps = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}.
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Figure 4-1: Secrecy capacity vs. (γ¯m, γ¯e) under a moderate correlation of ρ = 0.3.
It is interesting to see from Fig. 4-4 that channel correlation has different impacts
on the secrecy rate under different requirements of secrecy outage probability. For
a stringent requirement of ps (e.g. ps = 0.1 here), Rs increases significantly as ρ
increases, while Rs only increases slightly as ρ increases for a moderate requirement
of ps (e.g., ps = 0.3 here). For a less stringent requirement of ps (e.g., ps = 0.5 here),
however, Rs decreases slowly as ρ increases.
The results in Fig. 4-4 indicate that channel correlation is helpful when ps is small
(e.g., ps = {0.1, 0.3}), but becomes harmful when ps becomes large (e.g., ps = 0.5).
The main reason for such two different impacts is given as follows. Let random
variable U = γm/γe denote the instantaneous SNR ratio between the main and eaves-
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Figure 4-2: Secrecy capacity vs. correlation coefficient ρ.
dropper channels. Based on (4.21), we have
ps = P
(
U < 2Rs
(
1
γe
+ 1
)
−
1
γe
∣∣∣∣ γm > µ
)
= P (U < Us | γm > µ,Us < k)P (Us < k)
+ P (U < Us | γm > µ,Us > k)P (Us > k) , (4.30)
where Us = 2
Rs (1/γe + 1)− 1/γe. Moreover, the cumulative distribution function of
U can be derived as [19]
FU(u) =
1
2
+
u− k
2
√
(u+ k)2 − 4ρku
. (4.31)
It is notable that as ρ increases, FU(u) decreases if u < k, but increases if u > k.
Therefore, the first term P (U < Us | γm > µ,Us < k) in (4.30) decreases with ρ, while
the second term P (U < Us | γm > µ,Us > k) increases with ρ, which indicates that
the impacts of channel correlation is helpful on the first term, but becomes harmful
on the second term. When the secrecy outage probability ps is small, such as ps =
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Figure 4-3: Secrecy rate vs. (pt,ps) when γ¯m = 5 dB, γ¯e = 0 dB and ρ = 0.3.
{0.1, 0.3} in Fig. 4-4, Rs (and thus Us for a given value of γe) should be increased to
keep a fixed value of ps as ρ grows. This is because the helpful impact of correlation
on the first term in (4.30) dominates ps when ps is small. On the other hand, when
ps is large, such as ps = 0.5 in Fig. 4-4, Rs should be decreased to keep a fixed value
of ps as ρ grows. The region of ps for the different impacts of correlation can be
numerically found based on (4.20), though the closed-form expression is not given in
this thesis.
4.6.3 Secrecy Outage Probability vs. Overall Outage Prob-
ability
We now conduct a comparison between the secrecy outage probability and overall
outage probability, two metrics used to illustrate the security requirement literature.
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For the case that ρ = 0.3 and µ = 2Rs − 1, Fig. 4-5 illustrates how ps and Pout
vary with Rs for three different channel scenarios of γ¯m and γ¯e: a better scenario
with γ¯m = 5 dB and γ¯e = 0 dB, a normal scenario with γ¯m = 5 dB and γ¯e = 5 dB,
and a worse scenario with γ¯m = 0 dB and γ¯e = 5 dB. We can see from Fig. 4-5
that for all the three channel scenarios, Pout is much larger than ps, in particular
for the scenario that γ¯e ≤ γ¯m. The results in Fig. 4-5 indicate that using Pout in
system design will result in a conservative estimation on the maximum achievable
secrecy rate. For example, when the secrecy outage probability is required to be less
than 0.3, the maximum achievable Rs determined by using ps will be 0.52, which is
almost two times higher than the 0.28 maximum achievable Rs determined by using
the metric Pout.
Next, we examine in Fig. 4-6 how the difference between Pout and ps varies with
correlation coefficient ρ for all the three different scenarios, given that µ = 2Rs−1 and
Rs = 1. Fig. 4-6 shows that the difference between Pout and ps is large and almost
does not change with ρ for the above better scenario, but such difference under the
61
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
m = 5 dB, e  = 0 dB
m = 5 dB, e = 5 dB
  Pout
  ps
p s
 &
 P
ou
t
Secrecy Rate, Rs (in bits)
m = 0 dB, e = 5 dB
Figure 4-5: Secrecy outage probability ps and overall outage probability Pout vs.
secrecy rate Rs when ρ = 0.3.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
m = 0 dB, e = 5 dB
m = 5 dB, e = 5 dB
m = 5 dB, e = 0 dB
 Pout
 ps
p s
 &
 P
ou
t
Correlation coefficient, 
Figure 4-6: Secrecy outage probability ps and overall outage probability Pout vs.
correlation coefficient ρ when Rs = 1.
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other two scenarios approaches 0 as ρ increases to 1. Thus, under the better channel
condition that γ¯e ≤ γ¯m, ps rather than Pout should be adopted for the efficient design
of secure transmission system.
4.7 Summary
This chapter derived analytical models of secrecy capacity, transmission outage prob-
ability and secrecy outage probability for a correlated wire-tap channel system under
partial CSI, such that the fundamental performance limits for secure and reliable in-
formation transmission are fully addressed. It is notable that our models, derived for
correlated channels, also cover the corresponding models for independent channels as
special cases. The results in this chapter indicate that the correlation between main
and eavesdropper channels is always harmful to secrecy capacity, but has different
effects on outage performance, depending on secrecy rate adopted in the transmission
and also the SNR conditions of both main and eavesdropper channels.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This final chapter summarizes our contributions and points out several areas for future
search.
5.1 Summary of the Thesis
The notion of physical-layer security, which is regarded as information-theoretic secu-
rity since its security is derived purely from information theory, advocates a paradigm
shift in cryptography and calls for a physical layer design of security schemes. The
main idea of physical-layer security is to exploit the inherent randomness of the prop-
agation channels to significantly strengthen the security of digital communications
systems.
The objective of this thesis was to provide a comprehensive study on the funda-
mental performance limits of physical layer security under a fading wire-tap channel,
where the main channel is correlated with the eavesdropper channel and the trans-
mitter knows only the real time channel state information (CSI) of main channel.
With this goal in mind, we first analyze the asymptotic outage probability and out-
age secrecy capacity for the case when the transmission power is approaching infinity,
and then extends the study to the case when the transmission power is constrained.
The whole thesis is concluded in more details as follows.
• In Chapter 2, we defined the system models of correlated fading wire-tap channel
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and some preliminary knowledge about the physical layer security, including
the notions of error probability, equivocation rate, perfect secrecy, secrecy rate
and secrecy capacity. These definitions serves as the overall models for the
performance analysis in the next two chapters.
• In Chapter 3, we approached our objective by analyzing the asymptotic per-
formance limits of physical layer security. Firstly, we presented the secrecy
capacity for one pair of channel gains in high SNR regime, from which we found
that the secrecy capacity does not increase with transmission power and instead
controlled by the channel power gain ratio. Based on this result, we then derived
the closed-form asymptotic outage probability and asymptotic outage secrecy
capacity under the correlated Rayleigh fading wiretap channel, which cover the
special cases when the main and eavesdropper channels are independent. Based
on the above theoretical modelings, channel correlation were then revealed to
have constructive effect on the outage secrecy capacity if the asymptotic outage
probability is less than 1/2, and have destructive effect otherwise. To the best
of our knowledge, such results have never been exposed.
• In Chapter 4, we focused on the performance analysis of physical layer security
under a correlated fading wire-tap channel when the transmission power is con-
strained to a given value. Firstly, we derived the closed-form secrecy capacity
based on the typical Marcum Q function, which has been widely used in the
wireless communications and detection theories for radar systems [48] and thus
has been extensively studied recently [10, 79]. Secondly, two outage performance
metrics, namely transmission outage probability and secrecy outage probability,
were derived to characterize the reliability level and security level, respectively,
for the transmission scheme. Based on these theoretical modelings, we further
reveals that channel correlation is always harmful to secrecy capacity, but has
both helpful and harmful effects on outage performance, depending on secrecy
rate adopted in the transmission and also the SNR conditions of both main
and eavesdropper channels. This result confirms with one for the asymptotic
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behaviors in Chapter 3 in the sense that both helpful and harmful effects exist,
and have more explicit and complicate relation between different parameters.
5.2 Future works
The work presented in this thesis could be extended in many interesting directions.
• Closed-form results for other fading models. In this thesis, we mainly
focus on the closed-form results for the Rayleigh fading channel model, which
is considered as a reasonable model when there are many objects in the en-
vironment that scatter the radio signal before it arrives at the receiver [70],
such as radio signals in the heavily built-up urban environments. Although the
Rayleigh fading model is important for the physical layer study, there exists
some other fading models, such as Rician fading, Nakagami fading, Log-normal
shadow fading and Weibull fading, which are more suitable for some specific sce-
narios. For example, Rician fading is more applicable for modeling the signal
transmission when there is a dominant propagation along a line of sight between
the transmitter and receiver, such as the sparsely built-up rural environments.
Thus, the derivation process in this work can be directly help the analysis on
the other fading channel model.
• Multi-user information-theoretic security. Our study is based on the ba-
sic wire-tap model that consists of three users, namely a transmitter, a receiver,
and an eavesdropper. The results on such model can be generalized to the
models that includes more users, for example the broadcast wire-tap channel,
cooperative relay wire-tap channel, and etc. In the broadcast wire-tap channel,
multiple receivers and eavesdroppers are expected to receive the signal transmit-
ted from the same source node, while in the cooperative relay wire-tap channel,
the malicious node can receive the same message transmitted from both the
source node and relay node and more complicate correlation relations are ex-
pected. It is noticed that, as long as the signal is transmitted from one source
67
node to different receivers, channel correlation are observed in real communica-
tion environment. Therefore, it is of great significance and also challenging to
extend the study to the more general multi-user model.
• Single-input multiple-output wire-tap channel. The study for the model
that a receiver has multiple antennas, the SIMO wire-tap channel, is also one
important future work. It is very possible that both the legitimate receiver
and eavesdropper install multiple antennas to improve their signals. In such
transmission environment, channel correlation is a common phenomenon. The
insights brought by this analysis should shed light on the analysis of physical
layer security on those practical channel models.
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